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Does the Impact of Board Independence on Large Bank Risks 
Change After the Global Financial Crisis? 
 
 
 
Francesco Vallascas, Sabur Mollah, and Kevin Keasey *,† 
 
Abstract 
The view that the independent directors of large banks should contribute to safeguarding the interests of 
bank creditors and taxpayers, by exercising a stringent risk oversight of bank executives, has gained ground 
in the aftermath of the 2007-2009 crisis. Using a cross-country sample of large banks for the period 2004-
2014, we show that post 2009 an increase in board independence leads to more prudent bank risk-taking 
compared to the rest of the sample period. This effect materializes via independent boards favoring 
increases in bank capitalization and decreases in bank portfolio risk after the global crisis. Additional 
analyses demonstrate, however, that these results do not hold for all large banks in our sample but are 
confined to the group of banks benefiting from a government bailout during the crisis. In most large 
international banks board independence does not contribute to safeguarding the interests of bank creditors 
and taxpayers by constraining bank risk-taking.  
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1. Introduction 
In this paper we examine whether the impact of board independence on the risk-taking of large banks 
changes after the 2007-2009 global crisis. We base our analysis on a unique international sample of 262 
large banks, selected for the period 2004 – 2014.  
The instability of banks during the global crisis and the related widespread losses produced by the 
banking industry highlight the negative externalities that can be generated by bank excessive risk-taking, 
especially when banks are large (Zhang et al., 2015). It is widely believed that these externalities are also the 
result of ineffective monitoring mechanisms stemming from bank internal governance (Adams, 2012; 
Beltratti and Stulz, 2012; Erkens et al., 2012; Minton et al., 2014; OECD, 2010). Along these lines, the 
literature offers a particularly critical view of how independent directors monitored and advised bank 
executives before the global crisis (Adams, 2012; Anginer et al., 2016; Erkens et al., 2012; Minton et al., 
2014). In spite of this critical view, there is still an expressed belief in a number of policy reports and 
initiatives that large banks benefit from maintaining highly independent boards post the global crisis (Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, 2010; 2015). The consequent assumption is that independent directors 
should behave differently post the crisis thus becoming important to avoid bank excessive risk-taking.  
Understanding whether internal governance mechanisms, such as board independence, become 
effective in mitigating large bank risk-taking post the crisis is an important policy issue. Better functioning 
internal governance mechanisms would reduce the need for costly prudential regulatory interventions aimed 
at constraining bank risk-taking. The consequent regulatory response post the global crisis in the form of 
more stringent prudential requirements, in particular for large and systemically important banks, would then 
be less necessary.  
The literature focusing on the career concerns of independent directors and the market for directors 
offers a few reasons as to why the independent directors of large banks might be more effective in limiting 
excessive risk-taking post the global crisis (Jagannathan et al., 2015; Jiang et al., 2015). Independent directors 
aim to maintain a good reputation in the directorship market as this will help gain additional board seats in 
the labor market going forward (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Ferris et al., 2004; Jagannathan et al., 2015; 
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Yermack, 2004). In addition, reputational incentives are more relevant when directors sit on the boards of 
large corporations and these incentives amplify the directors’ efforts in the execution of their duties (see 
Masulis and Mobbs, 2014; 2016). In general, directors seen as negligent in performing their role are 
penalized by the directorship market (Fich and Shivdasani, 2007; Gilson, 1990; Harford, 2003). 
The assessment of the performance of independent directors, however, critically depends on what the 
market (and regulators in the case of banks) expects from them and, consequently, which objectives the 
directors should help a corporation to achieve. In this respect, the post-crisis perspective, as rooted in a 
number of regulatory guidelines and initiates (see Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2010; 
European Union 2010) and echoing the view of numerous academics and policy makers (Becht et al., 2012; 
Berger et al., 2014; Bolton et al., 2015), indicates that bank boards should favor a stakeholder approach. 
Bank independent directors should then contribute to balancing the different objectives of a wider set of 
stakeholders, including creditors and taxpayers, and not only focus on shareholder interests.  
Further, the growing emphasis on the stakeholder perspective is accompanied by regulators and 
supervisors explicitly requiring that independent directors facilitate a more accurate and stringent risk-
oversight post the crisis (see, for instance, the Dodd-Frank Act (July 2010) in the US and the EU Capital 
Requirements Directives (approved in 2013) in Europe). In summary, post the global crisis the general drive 
for bank boards has been to search for independent directors with the skills and knowledge to enable a 
more stringent risk-oversight of bank executives and to exercise this oversight taking into account the 
interests of the wider group of bank stakeholders. These changes have then the potential to influence the 
demand and supply of directors’ services in the labor market. 
To evaluate whether the changing landscape post the global crisis affects the relationship between board 
independence and bank risk, we construct our analysis in a panel data setting that relates accounting and 
market based measures of banking risk to the degree of board independence and its interaction with a 
dummy variable that identifies the post-crisis period. Following previous studies, we employ a bank’s Z-
Score as an accounting measure of risk (Beck et al., 2013; Boyd et al., 2006; Boyd and Runkle, 1993), and 
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bank volatility (Patham, 2009) and tail risk (Ellul and Yerramilli 2013; Van Bekkum, 2016) as market 
measures of risk-taking.  
 Our initial tests show that post the crisis an increase in board independence leads to more prudent bank 
risk-taking compared to the rest of the sample period. This result is confirmed for all the different risk 
measures we employ in our analysis and under different econometric methods. To further confirm that our 
results are not spurious we next focus on the impact of board independence on the components of a bank’s 
Z-Score; namely, ROA, the Equity Ratio and ROA Volatility. We conjecture that we should observe that i) 
the impact of board independence on at least some of these variables differs post 2009 (compared to the 
rest of the sample period) and ii) the observed differential impact should be consistent with an enhanced 
risk-decreasing effect of board independence on bank insolvency risk post 2009. In line with our conjecture, 
we demonstrate that the risk-mitigating effect observed post 2009 is accompanied by independent boards 
favoring increases in bank capitalization and decreases in bank ROA volatility.  
While these initial results apparently validate the regulatory perspective on the importance of board 
independence in banks, they are still insufficient to indicate a generalized shift in the impact of board 
independence on bank risk post the crisis. In particular, some of the banks in our sample have produced 
significantly larger damages for creditors and taxpayers, and consequently placed larger costs on public 
finances, in the aftermath of the global crisis. As a result, these banks have been subject to heavier regulatory 
and media scrutiny with the consequence of being more likely affected in the composition of their boards 
and on how independent directors interpret their role post-crisis. Our results might then be driven by 
independent directors sitting on the boards of bailout banks that are exercising a more stringent risk 
oversight to comply with wider stakeholder objectives post-bailout. 
 Our analysis proceeds, therefore, by exploring how our main findings vary amongst banks that have 
received a government bailout during the global crisis and the remaining banks in our sample. We start by 
initially examining the impact of board independence (measured at the end of 2006) on the likelihood to 
receive government support and on the amount of public funds per unit of bank assets that a bank has 
required to restore its capital strength. We find that banks with more independent boards before the crisis 
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tend to have a larger bailout probability and to extract significantly larger amounts of public funds (at the 
expense of taxpayers). This conclusion holds under different specifications and for the sub-sample of US 
banks and motivates concerns over the monitoring role of independent directors before the crisis especially 
if sitting on the boards of bailout banks.  
We then show that our findings for the post-global crisis period of a changing impact of board 
independence on bank risk are indeed driven by the independent directors sitting on the boards of bailout 
banks post the crisis. We confirm this result under different empirical settings and when we focus on the 
sub-sample of US banks. For the remaining large banks, independent directors remain ineffective as a risk-
mitigating mechanism in our sample period including the post-crisis period.  
Overall, our analysis shows that post the global crisis it is only the independent boards of large banks 
that have received government support that become significantly more aligned with broader stakeholder 
objectives and offer more stringent risk oversight. As the independence of large bank boards remain largely 
an uninfluential driver of risk-taking, the strengthening of the external monitoring of large banks by 
regulators and supervisors remains pivotal to safeguarding the interests of bank creditors and taxpayers.  
Our study contributes to the still limited literature that assesses the nexus between governance and bank 
risk using a cross-country setting (see, for instance, Laeven and Levine, 2009; Lepetit et al., 2015) and in 
particular to studies that examine the impact of board characteristics on bank risk and capital (Anginer et 
al., 2016; Beltratti and Stulz, 2012; Erkens et al., 2012). Our analysis extends and complements these studies 
by offering novel evidence on the changes in the impact of board independence on bank risk in the years 
following the crisis.  
Our analysis is also related to studies on the drivers of bank bailouts occurring during the global financial 
crisis (see, for instance, Adams, 2012; Bayazitova and Shivdasani, 2012), and especially to US studies (Berger 
and Roman 2015; Black and Hazelwood, 2013; Duchin and Sosyura, 2014) and cross-country studies 
(Brandao-Marques, 2012) that focus on the post-bailout behavior of supported banks. This latter group of 
analyses examine the bailout implications on competition (Berger and Roman 2015), the lending policy of 
small and large banks (Black and Hazelwood, 2013), lending risk and loan supply (Duchin and Sosyura, 
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2014) and risk-taking by rated banks (Brandao-Marques, 2012). Differently from our analysis, therefore, 
this group of studies does not focus on the nexus between bank governance and post-bailout behavior.  
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the potential impact of independent 
directors on the risk behavior of banks and why this impact could be different after the global crisis. Section 
3 presents the sample of large banks, and the definition and summary statistics for the key variables. Section 
4 discusses the baseline results, while Section 5 controls for differences between bailout and non-bailout 
banks. Section 6 offers conclusions. 
2. Bank Risk-Taking and the Role of Independent Directors 
As in any corporation, the boards of large banks can influence the risk choices of executives by means 
of their advisory and monitoring functions (see Adams et al., 2010). A particularly important role in shaping 
risk choices is normally assigned to independent directors. These directors are conventionally seen as better 
monitors than other directors as one of their key objectives is to maintain a good reputation in the 
directorship market (Fama and Jensen, 1983).   
Studies on non-financial firms show that career opportunities in the directorship market depend on 
independent directors achieving good past performance in the execution of their mandate (Coles and Hoi 
2003; Farrell and Whidbee 2000; Gilson, 1990; Harford 2003; Jiang et al., 2015). Good past performance 
has significant reputational effects that increase the chances to gain directorships in the labor market. In 
contrast, poorly performing directors see a decline in the demand for their services in the labor market and 
tend to hold fewer directorships (Fich and Shivdasani, 2007; Gilson, 1990; Harford, 2003). Furthermore, 
reputation concerns also affect the supply of director services in the labor market, with directors that are 
members of the boards of large corporations increasing their effort in performing their duties (see Masulis 
and Mobbs, 2014; 2016). 
The literature on non-financial firms normally links the notion of good performance by independent 
directors to the interests of shareholders (Coles et al., 2008; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 2003; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Wagner, 2011). In the case of large banks, however, what 
constitutes good performance by independent directors has been called into question by the global financial 
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crisis. The crisis is a key example of how excessively risky choices by large banks can impact on a wide 
range of stakeholders, including taxpayers, and, more importantly, produce instability at the systemic level 
(Acharya et al., 2014; Becht et al., 2012). As a result a growing number of studies (see, for instance, Adams, 
2012; Kirkpatrick, 2009; Ringe, 2013) and the media blame independent directors for not having played an 
effective advising and monitoring role in the years leading to the crisis.1  At the root of this criticism there 
is the view that the independent directors of banks should take into account the interests of the wide set of 
bank stakeholders that might be affected by bank business choices. Accordingly, they should favor a more 
prudent bank risk exposure even though this can go against the objective to maximize shareholder value 
(see Pathan, 2009, for a related argument).  
Numerous regulators and policy makers express a similar view of independent directors post the crisis 
(see Dermine (2013) for a summary). While they respond to the crisis by reaffirming the importance of 
maintaining highly independent boards in banks, they increasingly identify good board practices with 
actions safeguarding wider stakeholder objectives (see the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2010, 
2015; European Union 2010; OECD, 2010).  A good summary of this is contained in the 2010 report on 
how to enhance governance in banks, and in the following revisions, by the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (2010) stating that “…board should take into account the legitimate interests of shareholders, depositors and 
other relevant stakeholders. It should also ensure that the bank maintains an effective relationship with its supervisors”. pg(7)  
The statement above confirms the request to go beyond a shareholder oriented approach to bank 
governance but it also reminds us that the supervisory authorities are part of the wider set of bank 
stakeholders and as such play an active role in shaping the career perspectives of independent directors (see 
Hopt, 2013, Ringe, 2013). Supervisors are required to obtain the information needed to evaluate the 
expertise and integrity of board members and conduct a fit and proper person test of bank directors (Basel 
                                                     
1 For a critical view of the role played by independent directors during the crisis see, for instance, ‘Corporate boards that do 
their job’ Washington Post, 16 February 2009 A. 15, ‘Where were the boards? Accountability shouldn’t end with the CEO’, Wall Street 
Journal, 25 October 2008.  
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Committee on Banking Supervision, 2010), with the possibility of approving or denying a director’s election 
and removing them from their role (see Hopt, 2013). Consequently, not complying with supervisory 
guidelines on what constitutes good board practice might have significant career implications in the market 
for bank directors.  
Furthermore, in the attempt to establish more constructive governance systems in banks to monitor 
risk-taking, regulatory initiatives post the crisis attempt to ensure that the appointed independent directors 
have the appropriate abilities and tools to exercise an effective risk oversight on bank executives. For 
instance, the Basel Committee (2010) recommends that non-executive directors in large banks periodically 
meet the Chief Risk Officer in the absence of other senior managers while the EU Capital Requirements 
Directives (approved in 2013) stresses the importance of appointing directors with sufficient skills and time 
to understand bank risk-taking, and imposes limits on the number of directorships each director can hold. 
In a similar vein, the Dodd-Frank Act approved in the US in 2010 requires that banks establish risk 
committees including independent directors, with at least one being an expert in risk-management. 
Overall, post the global crisis, independent directors are expected to account for wider stakeholder 
objectives and to do so they are expected to have the skills and time to exercise a more stringent risk 
oversight of banks. Accordingly, if the changing landscape of banking is effective in modifying bank board 
practices, we should observe board independence leading to greater reductions in risk in the years following 
the global crisis as compared to the rest of the sample period.  
3. Sample and Variables  
3.1 Sample 
We use a sample of listed, large commercial banks and bank holding companies with accounting data 
available in BankScope by Bureau van Dijk and market data available in Datastream International. We select 
the sampled banks from an initial list consisting of the top 500 listed large commercial banks and bank 
holding companies across the globe in terms of total assets at the end of the fiscal year 2004. The sample 
period ranges from 2004 to 2014. More precisely, the dependent variables are observed over the period 
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2005-2014, while the bank characteristics employed as explanatory variables are lagged one year to reduce 
endogeneity and simultaneity biases. As a result, they refer to the period 2004-2013. 
From the initial list of the top 500 banks we retain in the sample institutions with governance data 
available from annual reports, governance reports and via web-searches of company websites, Bloomberg, 
Forbes and Business Week. Furthermore, given our analysis also relies on the estimation of market-based 
measures of risk, we exclude banks that in a given year have less than 80 daily stock returns and banks for 
which the majority of daily stock returns are equal to zero.   
The final sample consists of 262 banks chartered in 45 countries with a total number of 2,309 
observations. Despite the different selection criteria, our number of banks is similar to those employed in 
two recent cross-country studies that focus on the cross-sectional relationship between bank governance 
and performance during the global financial crisis (see Beltratti and Stulz, 2012; Erkens et al., 2012).2 Table 
1 reports the sample distribution by country. A large number of banks are concentrated in Japan and in the 
US, with respectively 19.08% and 16.07% of the total number of observations. The high concentration of 
the sample in these two countries is consistent with Beltratti and Stulz (2012). For the remaining countries, 
a country’s share in terms of total observations does not exceed 5%.  
*******TABLE 1 HERE ******* 
3.2 Measuring Bank Risk  
We employ accounting and market-based measures of bank risk in our analysis. Our accounting measure 
of risk is a bank’s Z-Score, a widely used indicator of bank insolvency risk and risk-taking (see Beck et al., 
2013; Boyd and Runkle, 1993; Houston et al., 2010; Laeven and Levine, 2009). The use of Z-Score as a risk 
measure is motivated by a notion of insolvency that occurs when bank losses are larger than the value of 
bank equity. Formally, the Z-Score is equal to the return on assets plus the equity to asset ratio all divided 
                                                     
2 Specifically, Beltratti and Stulz (2012) employ a maximum number of 281 banks in their regression analysis (see Table 4, page 
13), while Erkens et al. (2012) use a sample of 296 financial firms of which only 177 are classified as banks (see Table 1: Panel B, 
page 394).  
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by the standard deviation of asset returns. Given the highly skewed distribution of Z-Score, we employ its 
natural logarithm as a dependent variable in our tests, with the addition of a negative sign to indicate a 
higher bank risk in the presence of higher values. As in Boyd et al. (2006), we compute a panel data version 
of the Z-Score using an instantaneous measure of the standard deviation of bank ROA, defined as the 
absolute deviation of a bank’s yearly ROA from the bank average ROA computed over the full sample 
period. By computing the standard deviation of bank asset returns in this way, and not on a rolling window 
basis, we avoid  variations in the Z-Score capturing primarily the impact of past business policies. This is 
particularly important in the context of our analysis, as we aim at understanding if any change in the impact 
of board independence on risk emerges post the global crisis and we do not want to capture effects related 
to business choices that are prior to this possible change.   
Accounting based measures of risk are, however, backward looking and may be affected by accounting 
manipulation that might especially materialize in terms of loss recognition. We, therefore, also use three 
market measures of bank risk that are more forward looking and less influenced by accounting discretion. 
The first is the volatility of bank daily stock returns computed yearly (Equity Volatility). The remaining 
two measures focus on the downside of bank risk expressed by the lower tail of the stock return distribution. 
As such, tail risk measures indicate the risk of severe wealth losses not only for shareholders but also for 
debtholders. This is because debtholders hold fixed claims on a bank’s cash flows and the lower tail of the 
return distribution makes a loss of some of their principle more likely (Van Bekkum, 2016). 
*******TABLE 2 HERE ******** 
The first tail risk measure is a bank’s Value at Risk (VaR) that corresponds to (minus) the daily stock 
return equal to the 𝛼 percentile of the yearly distribution, reflecting the lowest return a bank can experience 
in 100(1 − 𝛼)% of the trading days in a year. As in Van Bekkum (2016) we measure VaR as the negative 
value of the stock return corresponding to the 5th percentile of the yearly distribution of daily stock returns. 
The second tail risk measure is the Expected Shortfall (ES). Following Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) and Van 
Bekkum (2016), ES is computed as the average return below the 5th percentile of the yearly distribution of 
the daily stock returns. More formally, as suggested by Acharya et al. (2017), ES can be expressed as: 
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ESi
𝛼=-E[Ri,t|Ri,t<-VaRi
𝛼]      (1) 
where Ri,t  is the daily stock return for bank i at day t and  VaRi
𝛼  is a bank’s Value-at-Risk. 
Conventionally, as shown by (1), to compute ES the average of the daily stock returns in the lower tail of 
the return distribution is multiplied by minus one. Hence, higher values of ES indicate a higher bank tail 
risk.  
Panel A of Table 2 reports summary statistics of the Z-score, and its components, and the three market 
measures of risk described in this section. 
3.3 Econometric Method and Control Variables 
To estimate how the impact of board independence on bank risk changes after 2009 compared to the 
rest of the sample period we employ a fixed effect linear regression model that assumes the following 
functional form: 
Yi,t=αi+β1 BOARD INDEPENDENCE + β2BOARD INDEPENDENCE ∗ POST2009 + β3POST2009+δBCi,t-1+γCCk,t+εit (1) 
Where Yi,t  is one of the risk variables described in the previous section, BOARD INDEPENDENCE 
is the ratio between the number of independent directors and the total number of board members, BC is a 
vector of bank-specific characteristics and CC is a vector of country-specific control variables.3 The key 
coefficient for our analysis is β
2
 as it captures the change in the impact of board independence on bank risk 
after 2009. The use of a fixed effect model is motivated by the fact that differences in bank risk are partly 
due to bank characteristics that are not observable and constant across time (e.g. an institution’s culture of 
risk management). The estimation of a separate intercept (αi ) for each bank before fitting the slope 
coefficients allows us to control for time-invariant sources of bank heterogeneity that are not observable 
                                                     
3 As in previous cross-country studies (see Erkens, et al., 2012; Onali et al., 2016), we measure board independence by 
employing the definition of independent directors as offered at the company level in compliance with the domestic regulation. This 
definition usually refers to directors that i) are not internal to the company; ii) are not characterized by any direct or indirect business 
relationship with the bank. 
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and to focus on variations in risk at the level of individual banks over time. Furthermore, we cluster standard 
errors at the bank level to control for possible within group serial correlation. 
Panels B and C of Table 2 report definitions and descriptive statistics for the explanatory variables. In 
the identification of the controls to include in our specification, we follow studies on the drivers of a bank’s 
risk (see, for instance, Bertay et al., 2013; Hagendorff et al., 2017; Pathan, 2009). We control for bank size, 
measured via the log of bank total assets (Size), and the related importance of too-big to fail concerns. 
Additional bank-specific characteristics include the book-to market ratio (Book-to-Market), bank funding 
choices - defined as the ratio between customer deposits and bank total debts (Deposits), bank asset 
composition - measured by the ratio between total loans and total assets (Loans) and the riskiness of bank 
lending policy (Lending Risk) that we measure with the ratio between loan loss reserves and total loans.  
We also include additional governance characteristics that are supposed to influence bank risk and the 
role of independent directors within an organization. The first variable is the log transformation of the 
number of board members (Board Size). The literature suggests that larger boards are easier controlled by 
managers. This is because the co-ordination problems among the board members increase as the board size 
increases (Bushman and Smith, 2001) and thus, a small board can be a more effective monitoring tool 
(Jensen, 1993; Pathan, 2009; Yermack, 1996).  
A second governance variable refers to CEO characteristics and in particular to his/her power within 
the organization. A more powerful CEO might restrict the information flow to the board and hence reduce 
the board’s independent oversight of managers and this might influence business choices (Fama and Jensen, 
1983; Jensen, 1993). We measure CEO power (CEO Power) with an index constructed as the sum of three 
dummy variables. The first dummy variable is equal to one if the CEO has been internally appointed to 
his/her current role, signaling a longer working experience inside the bank that should lead to greater power 
(Pathan, 2009). The second dummy variable is equal to one if the CEO is also the chairman of the board; 
in such a case, the CEO should be characterized by greater power within the corporation (Pathan, 2009). 
The third variable is equal to one if the CEO is the only non-independent director in the board, signaling 
therefore his/her centrality to the information flow between the board and other senior members of the 
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executive team (Faleye, 2015; Joseph et al., 2014). The index ranges, therefore, from zero to three with 
larger values denoting greater CEO power.  
We then control for a bank’s ownership structure via the percentage of shares held by institutional 
shareholders (Institutional Shareholders) that we obtain from Capital IQ. Institutional shareholders are 
supposed to have a larger capability to monitor managers (Agrawal and Mandelker, 1990; Burns et al., 2010) 
and larger diversification opportunities than other shareholders. These factors might, therefore, impact on 
bank business policies and the related risk-taking.  
In terms of country controls, as in Carbó-Valverde et al. (2013), we account for the degree of corruption 
at the country level to reflect cross-country differences in a government’s susceptibility to regulatory 
capture. We measure corruption (Corruption) as minus the Freedom from Corruption Index, provided by the 
Heritage Foundation, with higher values denoting higher corruption in a country. The index from Barth et 
al. (2001), and the related surveys from the World Bank, on the strength of the supervisory agency in a 
country (Supervisory Strength) allows us to control for the potential impact on bank risk from differences 
in the supervisory structure across countries. We also add a dummy equal to one when a country has 
abandoned Basel I over the sample period (No Basel I) with the purpose of controlling for the influence 
of the capital regulatory regime and we control for the degree of concentration of the domestic banking 
market (Concentration) that is supposed to be related to bank risk (see Allen et al., 2011; and Beck et al., 
2005). 
The annual growth rate in real GDP (GDP Growth) is employed to control for the effect of the business 
cycle on the evolution of bank business choices, while the ratio between public debt and country GDP 
(Public Debt) controls for possible differences in the capacity of countries to rescue financial institutions. 
Furthermore, following Laeven and Levine (2009) we also control for the GDP per capita (Econ_Dev) to 
account for differences in risk due to differences in economic development across countries. As studies on 
non-financial firms show higher risk-taking in countries characterized by a higher protection of shareholder 
interests (John et al., 2008), the model includes an index measuring shareholder protection (Shareholder 
Protection), drawn from Doing Business by World Bank. Finally, as in Carbó-Valverde et al. (2013), we 
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control for the volatility of the domestic stock market defined by the Datastream Domestic Market Index 
(Market Volatility) to remove the possibility that our risk measures, especially the market based measures, 
capture general market trends and not the idiosyncratic choices of banks. 
4. Board Independence and Bank Risk and the Changes Post the Global crisis 
4.1 Baseline results 
In this section we test whether the impact of board independence on accounting and market based 
measures of bank risk changes post 2009; namely, after the global financial crisis. We report the results of 
this analysis in Table 3. We start by estimating in column (1) a model where the dependent variable is the 
negative value of the log transformation of a bank’s Z-score and with a limited number of controls (in 
addition to board independence and its interaction with the post-2009 dummy). Specifically, in this 
specification we control only for bank size, and for the set of country controls described in section 3.3. 
Notably, to reduce the risk of multicollinearity, and to ease the interpretation of our results, we follow 
Vallascas and Hagendorff (2013) and adopt a demean approach in constructing the interaction term 
between board independence and the post-2009 dummy. This approach consists of subtracting the 
respective sample mean from board independence before computing the interaction term. As a result, under 
this specification the coefficient of the post-2009 dummy refers to a bank with an average degree of board 
independence (that is, when the interaction term is equal to zero). 
The next two specifications include additional bank characteristics (column (2)) that are supposed to 
affect a bank’s risk, and additional governance controls (column (3)). We then replicate these two latter 
specifications (columns (4) to (9)) using as dependent variables the market measures of bank risk that we 
describe in section 3.2. Notably, in this case we also add the equity ratio as a further control variable. 
***TABLE 3 HERE*** 
The results consistently suggest that post-2009, there is a significant decrease in the coefficient 
associated with board independence as indicated by the negative and highly significant coefficient of the 
interaction between board independence and the post-2009 dummy. This negative coefficient of the 
interaction term suggests that the way independent directors of large banks interpret their mandate has 
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significantly changed after 2009, becoming more aligned with the objective of avoiding excessive risk-taking 
by banks.  
The result mentioned above holds under the different model specifications reported in Table 3 - 
especially, it is confirmed for both accounting and market measures of bank risk. Notably, the coefficient 
associated with board independence for the period 2004-2009 (that is, when the interaction term is equal 
to zero) is insignificant in all models, showing, therefore, that independent directors did not help to mitigate 
bank risk-taking in the period culminating with the global financial crisis. The lack of impact of board 
independence on bank risk is in line with the evidence reported in a number of recent studies (Anginer et 
al., 2016; Erkens et al., 2012; Minton et al., 2014). 
In terms of control variables, we find that our fixed effect models identify numerous bank and country 
characteristics that significantly affect bank risk. For instance, we find that all measures of risk decline when 
a bank’s funding structure is based on customer deposits and increases when banks take more risk via their 
lending business. In the case of market measures of risk, we also find that risk increases when banks have 
a lower charter value (higher book-to-market ratio), are less capitalized or have more institutional 
shareholders in their ownership structure. Interestingly, we do not find consistent results on how other 
governance characteristics, such as board size and CEO power, affect bank risk. 
Moving onto the analysis of country controls, our results show that bank risk increases in countries with 
greater stock market volatility and declines in the presence of higher GDP growth or public debt over GDP. 
This latter result is in line with the view that banks might reduce their risk-taking when located in countries 
with a lower bailout capability (Hagendorff et al., 2017). The impact of banking system characteristics 
(Supervisory Strength, No Basel 1 and Concentration) depends on the way we measure bank risk.  
Overall, our findings indicate that after 2009 independent directors seem to be more inclined to exercise 
a stronger risk-oversight on banks, thus becoming more aligned with the view that bank boards should 
become a line of defense not only for bank shareholders but also for the wider set of bank stakeholders.  
4.2 Additional Tests 
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In this section we discuss the results of a series of additional tests aimed at assessing the robustness of 
our findings. In the interest of brevity we report the results of these tests in Table A1 in the Online 
Appendix. 
The use of a fixed effect model, while helpful in reducing omitted variable problems due to unobservable 
time-invariant bank characteristics, substantially removes cross-sectional variation across banks by only 
focusing on within-firm variation. To understand whether our results change when we account for variation 
across banks, we re-estimate the models in Table 3 by using a random effect specification with country 
dummies. We do not find significant changes in our findings.     
Another possible concern related to the results discussed above is the endogeneity of several right-hand 
side variables and in particular board independence. One key source of endogeneity is reverse causality. For 
instance, it might be the case that bank risk-taking drives the appointment of independent directors (with 
these directors that might be inclined, for instance, to avoid very risky institutions because of reputational 
concerns). While this concern is mitigated by our fixed effect specification based on lagged values of the 
explanatory variables, we employ several additional empirical strategies to control for reverse causality. 
Initially, we follow Boone et al. (2007), Faleye et al. (2014) and Faleye (2015) among others that deal 
with reverse causality by regressing the dependent variable on longer lagged values of the potentially 
endogenous explanatory variables. The intuition here is that such historical values are largely predetermined 
(Faleye, 2015). Accordingly, we re-estimate the equations with the explanatory bank-characteristics 
(including board independence) that are lagged two years. The results still confirm our key findings.  
Next, as in Wintoki et al. (2012), we control for endogeneity by using a two-step system GMM dynamic 
panel model (Blundell and Bond, 1998) with standard errors adjusted as suggested by Windmeijer (2005). 
This approach relies on lagged values of the endogenous variables as instruments in the difference equation 
and on the first-difference of the same variables in the level equation. This method is appropriate to control 
for forms of dynamic endogeneity that arise when an explanatory variable is correlated with past values of 
the dependent variable, as is often the case in governance studies (Wintoki et al., 2012). We treat all firm 
characteristics as endogenous and limit the number of instruments using the values at time t-2 as 
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instruments in the difference equation and the first lag difference in the level equations. The conventional 
tests employed to validate this setting (the m2 test on the lack of second order serial correlation and the 
Hansen J test on instrument validity) support our choice and the results confirm our key findings.4 
Finally, we estimate an instrumental variable (IV) fixed effect model (with contemporaneous explanatory 
variables). While, as suggested by Adams and Mehran (2012), it is problematic to identify an appropriate 
instrument in governance studies, in our context some support comes from the cross-country dimension 
of our analysis. We identify the first instrument on the basis of cross-country differences in media influence 
that Dyck and Zingales (2004) link to a decline in the potential private benefits that senior managers can 
extract from corporations. Higher media influence should then reduce the need for board independence. 
We capture media influence via the log transformation of the ratio between the number of daily newspapers 
in circulation and the total population in a country. The second instrument is motivated by studies showing 
that similar corporations opt for similar governance models (Faleye, 2015, Joseph et al., 2014). A benchmark 
constructed for different groups of banks might, therefore, explain variation in the percentage of 
independent directors across banks. We cannot, however, employ any industry benchmark as in Faleye 
(2015) or a country benchmark (given the low number of banks in some of the countries). We use instead 
as an instrument the median degree of board independence by groups of banks aggregated on the basis of 
the legal origin of the country of residence and the size of the banking system. We define the legal origin 
of a country following La Porta et al. (1998). Furthermore, we classify banks as operating in small or large 
banking systems on the basis of the median value of a banking system total assets computed on an annual 
basis. Finally, we require that for each group of banking firms there are at least four yearly observations 
                                                     
4 In the case of the two market risk measures (Equity Volatility and VaR), the model requires adding a two lag period of the 
dependent variable to remove serial correlation and validate the GMM specification. 
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before calculating the yearly median of board independence. 5, 6  The second stage regression confirms our 
key findings for three out of the four risk measures.  
Overall, taken together the tests reported in this section add confidence to our findings. However, as in 
any governance study, it is challenging to reach an unambiguous causal interpretation of the findings. 
Nevertheless, at minimum, our analysis is suggestive of the presence of a strong, and robust change in the 
association between risk and board independence after the global financial crisis.  
4.3 Board Independence and the Z-Score Components  
Another way to exclude the possibility that our results are spurious is to conduct additional tests that 
employ the components of the Z-Score (namely, ROA, the Equity Ratio and ROA Volatility) as dependent 
variables. Given the results reported in the first three columns of Table 3, we should observe that i) the 
impact of board independence on at least some of these variables differs post 2009 (compared to the rest 
of the sample period) and ii) the observed differential impact should be consistent with an enhanced risk-
decreasing effect of board independence on bank insolvency risk in the second part of our sample period.  
***TABLE 4 HERE*** 
                                                     
5 Another complication is the fact that the interaction terms between board independence and the post-2009 dummy might be 
plausibly endogenous. Accordingly, we use the interactions between the two instruments described above and the post-2009 
dummy as instruments for the endogenous interaction terms. 
6 The instruments have to satisfy two conditions. First, they have to be correlated with the endogenous variable after all other 
exogenous variables are controlled for. The results of the first-stage regression (available upon request) show that both instruments 
enter the model with a significant coefficients and the expected sign. Furthermore, as shown in the Online Appendix, we reject (at 
the 5%-level) the Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic that tests the null hypothesis that the instruments are weakly correlated with the 
endogenous variables. Second, the instruments should not be correlated with the error term of the second-stage regression. The 
fact we cannot reject the Hansen test, where the null hypothesis is that all instruments are valid, indicates that also the second 
condition is satisfied.  
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To conduct these additional tests, we re-estimate the models shown in columns (2) and (3) of Table 3 
using each of the components of the Z-Score as a dependent variable. We report the results of these tests 
in Table 4. 
The first two columns of Table 4, where a bank’s ROA is the dependent variable, do not indicate a 
significant shift in the sensitivity of bank profitability to board independence post 2009. In short, we do 
not find that board independence matters for bank profitability and we do not find any different effect post 
2009. 
The analysis based on the other two components of the Z-Score offers, however, a different picture. 
For both components we find evidence of a shift in the impact played by board independence post 2009 
and this shift is consistent with a more prudent risk-taking attitude by independent directors in the second 
part of our sample period.  
Specifically, when the dependent variable is a bank’s equity ratio we find a larger positive coefficient of 
board independence post 2009. Moving onto the analysis of bank ROA volatility, we observe a larger 
negative coefficient assigned to board independence post 2009. These findings indicate that there are two 
channels by which board independence impacts on bank Z-score differently after the global crisis. The first 
is in terms of strengthening a bank’s capital adequacy post-crisis. The second channel is through a decline 
in portfolio risk. This latter result is also in line with the evidence that we obtain from the tail risk regressions 
indicating that banks with more independent boards are less willing to engage in business policies that 
expose the organization to extreme losses after the global crisis as compared to the rest of the sample 
period. 
 To recap, the results discussed in this section provide additional support for a significant shift in the 
way independent directors interpret their role after the global financial crisis and this shift is consistent with 
independent directors favoring less aggressive risk-taking policies by banks post 2009 as compared to the 
rest of the sample period. 
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5. Is there a Generalized Shift in the Role of Board Independence Post the Global Crisis?  
The post-2009 results indicate a shift in the role played by independent boards in our sample of large 
banks. This shift is coherent with the argument that post the crisis independent directors have been 
influenced by the growing pressure to safeguard wider stakeholder objectives that emerges in the banking 
industry and by the related request that these directors exercise a stronger risk oversight of bank executives.  
Our analysis, however, does not necessarily imply a generalized shift in the impact of board 
independence on bank risk. In fact, our results could be confined to some specific large banking firms. In 
this respect, some of the banks in our sample have produced significantly larger damages for creditors and 
taxpayers, and consequently placed larger costs on public finances, in the aftermath of the global crisis. As 
a result, these banks have been subject to heavier regulatory and media scrutiny that is likely to affect their 
board composition and how independent directors interpret their role post-crisis. Therefore, our results 
might be observable in banks receiving a government bailout but not necessarily in the rest of the sampled 
banks. In such a case, the importance of board independence as a governance mechanism to constrain bank 
excessive risk-taking would be still marginal even after the global financial crisis. 
In this section, we present a series of tests that aim to show how our analysis differs between bailout 
banks and the remaining banks in our sample. 
5.1 Large Bank Bailouts and Board Independence 
We start by offering evidence motivating the strong criticism of the role independent directors played 
in bailout banks. Essentially, we aim to show that having more independent boards before the crisis did not 
contribute to reducing the likelihood that banks required public support to be recapitalized and the related 
costs on taxpayers. To this end, we relate pre-crisis bank characteristics (measured at the end of 2006), 
including board independence, to the negative impact produced by banks on taxpayers and public finances. 
We use two proxies for the negative impact that banks have produced on taxpayers. The first is a dummy 
equal to one if a bank receives capital support during the crisis. The second is the aggregate value of public 
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funds a bank has received scaled by the volume of bank total assets at the end of 2006. 7 We identify 54 
banks in the sample that have received capital support in the period 2007-2009. 
We regress the above measures on board independence and a set of controls including bank 
characteristics used in our previous tests. Furthermore, we control for the marginal expected shortfall 
(MES) measured as in Acharya et al. (2017), indicating the degree of systemic risk characterizing a bank in 
2006 (as more systemically relevant banks might have a higher likelihood of receiving public support), and 
for the value of bank implicit government subsidy received by a bank in 2006, named as IPP, that, as 
described in the Appendix, we estimate similarly as in Carbó-Valverde et al. (2012) and Hovakimian, and 
Kane (2000).8 Larger values of IPP indicate that banks extract more value from the financial safety net by 
engaging in risk-shifting strategies at the expense of taxpayers. The models also include country dummies. 
 When we employ the dummy indicating a bailout as a dependent variable, we conduct our analysis via 
a logit model, while we employ a Tobit regression when the dependent variable is defined by the value of 
the received public funds scaled by total assets. In this latter case, the dependent variable is left censored 
because of the presence of a number of banks that did not require public funds in the period under 
investigation.  
***TABLE 5 HERE*** 
                                                     
7 We draw data on public funded recapitalizations from ProPublica (http://projects.propublica.org/bailout/list) for U.S. 
financial institutions, from Mediobanca (2014) for European financial institutions, and from annual reports as well as company 
websites and from the Grail Report (2009) for the remainder of the sample. 
8 IPP is based on the model proposed by Duan et al. (1992). In this model, banks can increase the fair value of the deposit 
insurance premium (namely, the value that would be appropriate to pay to the deposit insurance fund) by increasing leverage and 
portfolio risk. In this model, the fair insurance premium assumes the form of a put option written on bank assets. To put it 
differently, IPP represents the amount of insurance premium a bank should pay to allow taxpayers to break-even if they were to 
hedge the bank’s tail risk shifted to them. Therefore, under the assumption that the insured premium actually paid by banks is 
negligible, IPP is a proxy of the safety-net benefits that banks extract from taxpayers. 
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We report the results of these tests in Table 5. Overall, we find that an increase in board independence 
does not help to reduce the likelihood of a bailout or the value of a bank recapitalization via public funds. 
In contrast, banks entering the crisis with a higher degree of board independence need more public funds 
per unit of bank assets to restore their capital levels. This latter result is confirmed when we change the 
model specification and, as shown in columns 4) and 5) of Table 5. Further, it also holds when we estimate 
the model on the sub-sample of US banks. Interestingly, in most of the specifications we find that banks 
that benefited from a larger mispricing of government guarantees before the crisis (as measured by IPP) 
required more public funds in response to the crisis. 
In summary, the tests discussed in this section show that independent directors in large banks were 
ineffective in containing the costs of the global crisis for taxpayers. In contrast, more independent boards 
before the crisis lead to higher rescue costs for the public finances. 
5.2 The Changing Impact of Board Independence on Bank Risk Post the Global Crisis for Bailout and Non-Bailout 
Banks  
A key implication of the results of the above test is that independent directors sitting on the boards of 
bailout banks are likely to face even more pressure post bailout to safeguard wider stakeholder objectives 
and to exercise a stronger risk oversight than independent directors on the boards of other banks. We 
investigate the validity of this argument in Table 6 where we re-estimate the risk regressions reported in 
Table 3 by differentiating in the post-crisis period bailout banks from the remaining banks in the sample. 
Specifically, from the original post 2009 dummy, we construct two variables: the first is a dummy equal to 
one after 2009 only for the sampled banks that did not receive public funds while the second refers to the 
recapitalized banks via a bailout. We then interact these two dummies with board independence in the risk 
regressions.  
***TABLE 6 HERE*** 
The results consistently indicate that only the interaction between board independence and the dummy 
variable referring to bailout banks is negative and highly significant.  For the remaining banks in the sample, 
we do not find that board independence has a different influence on bank risk post 2009 as compared to 
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the rest of the sample period. The result we observe post 2009 is, therefore, driven by banks rescued via 
public funds and does not extend to all banks in our sample. In short, independent directors opt for a more 
stakeholder-oriented approach and stronger risk-oversight only in those banks that are under heavy 
regulatory and media scrutiny because of the costs placed on public finances (and the related damages for 
bank creditors and taxpayers). 
In Table A2 in the Online Appendix, we repeat the analysis using an alternative empirical setting. 
Specifically we repeat the tests separately for the bailout and non-bailout banks. This allows us to control 
for other potential differences in the determinants of bank risk between the two sub-samples. In line with 
the results reported above, we find that only in the group of bailout banks is the interaction term between 
the post crisis dummy and the degree of board independence negative and significant at customary levels.  
We next repeat the above tests for the sub-sample of US banks. The focus on a single country, for which 
we have a significant number of bailouts, reduces the possibilities that our results are somehow driven by 
omitted factors.  In general, as reported in Table A3, our results remain in line with the full sample analysis. 
To recap, the results presented in this section show that board independence has a different impact on 
bank risk post 2009 but only in the case of banks requiring public support to survive the global financial 
crisis. To put it differently, while we do not find evidence of a generalized shift in the risk-taking attitude 
of independent boards of large banks post 2009, we do find that the post 2009 result is driven by the boards 
of bailout banks. 
5.3 Board Independence and the Z-Score Components on Bailout and Non-Bailout Banks 
We next extend the analysis by using the Z-Score components as dependent variables. In essence, in the 
case of the Z-Score, we try to understand through which channels the changes in the risk-taking attitude 
observed for the independent boards of bailout banks materialize post-crisis. We report the results of these 
additional tests in Table 7. 
As shown in columns (5) and (6), we find that for the group of bailout banks the different impact of 
board independence on Z-Score post 2009 materializes via a significant decline in ROA volatility as 
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indicated by the negative and highly significant coefficient of the interaction between board independence 
and the dummy variable identifying rescued banks for the years following the crisis.  
In contrast, as in the case of the results reported in Table 3, we do not find that the impact of board 
independence on bank profitability changes post 2009 for both bailout and non-bailout banks. 
Furthermore, more independent boards in bailout banks do not mitigate bank risk by strengthening the 
capital adequacy more than other boards post 2009. Essentially, as shown in columns (3) and (4) of Table 
7, while all banks in our sample experience an increase in their capital ratios post 2009, only in the group 
of non-bailout banks is this increase amplified by the degree of board independence. 
When we repeat the analysis for the sub-sample of US banks we achieve similar conclusions. In other 
words, as shown by Table A4 in the Online Appendix, we still find a different effect of board independence 
on the Z-score component post 2009 only in the regression that uses ROA volatility as the dependent 
variable but only for bailout banks. 
***TABLE 7 HERE*** 
All in all, these tests indicate that the primary channel by which board independence influences the Z-
score of bailout banks post-crisis is by constraining the ROA volatility; namely, by emphasizing  business 
policies that reduce bank portfolio risk. 
6. Conclusions 
Recent empirical studies on bank boards do not unequivocally associate a growing board independence 
with more stable banks (see, for instance, Adams, 2012; Anginer et al., 2016; Erkens et al., 2012; Minton et 
al., 2014). While these studies offer evidence primarily from the pre-crisis or crisis periods, in this paper we 
take a different perspective. Specifically, we test whether the impact of board independence on bank risk-
taking has changed post the global crisis as compared to the period culminated with the crisis.  
Our analysis is motivated by a number of post crisis regulatory reports and initiatives indicating the 
importance of bank boards as tools to safeguard wider stakeholder objectives and not simply the interests 
of shareholders (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2010; 2015) and by the related request of a 
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stronger risk oversight of bank executives by independent boards. In general, these two aspects have the 
potential to influence the reputational incentives faced by independent directors in the labor market and 
the types of independent directors sought by bank boards in the post crisis period with the consequence to 
make board independence a more effective risk-mitigating mechanism post the crisis. 
By using a sample of large international banks, our initial analysis offers strong evidence that more 
independent boards change their risk-taking attitude post 2009, hence supporting our initial conjecture. In 
short, for both accounting and market based measures of risk, we find an enhanced risk-decreasing effect 
of board independence after the crisis. This effect is accompanied by more independent boards favoring 
increases in capital strength and declines in ROA volatility post the crisis.  
 Additional tests demonstrate, however, that our initial finding does not reflect a generalized shift of the 
impact of board independence on bank risk that applies to all the banks in our sample. Instead, we show 
that the above result is driven by the sub-sample of banks receiving a government bailout around the global 
financial crisis. In fact, for the rest of the banks in our sample, the degree of board independence does not 
seem to matter for bank risk-taking in spite of the changes in regulatory attitudes post the crisis. 
Overall, our results imply that the impact of board independence on risk-taking in large international 
banks remains somewhat limited and insufficient to safeguard the interests of bank creditors and taxpayers. 
The limited effectiveness of internal governance mechanisms in the form of independent boards that we 
observe in our study suggests that the need to strengthen the external monitoring by regulators and 
supervisors on large banks remains critical if financial stability is to be protected.  
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Appendix: The Estimation of IPP 
 
IPP is the fair value of the deposit insurance premium (namely, the value that would be appropriate to 
pay to the deposit insurance fund) and increases with bank leverage and portfolio risk. IPP assumes the 
form of a put option written on bank assets and, when expressed as a per unit of insured debt, can be 
formulated as follows: 
IPPi,t=N(y+σA,t√T)-(1-δ)
VA,t
Lt
N(y)    (1A) 
where y=
ln[Lt/VA,t(1-δ)]-σA,t
2  T/2
σA,t
 , L  is the volume of bank total liabilities, VA,t  is the market value of bank 
total assets, σA,t is the volatility of bank asset returns, and 𝛿 is the dividend payout ratio, defined as the ratio 
between dividend paid and the market value of bank assets. 
The computation of IPP requires the estimation of two unobservables, the volatility of bank asset 
returns and the market value of bank assets. To measure bank asset return volatility and the market value 
of bank assets, we follow Flannery and Sorescu (1996), Ronn and Verma (1986), and Vallascas and 
Hagendorff (2013). Specifically, we use option pricing to derive a bank’s asset return volatility and the 
market value of assets from the market value of equity and the volatility of equity returns. As in Vallascas 
and Hagendorff (2013) and Vassalou and Xing (2004), we infer the volatility of bank asset returns (σA,t) and 
the market value of bank assets (VA,t) using an iterative process based on the Black-Scholes-Merton pricing 
model. We express the market value of a bank’s equity (VE,t) as a function of the (unobservable) market 
value of assets (VA,t) and derive asset value and the volatility of asset returns by solving the following system 
of nonlinear equations:  
  VE,t=VA,tN(d1,t)-Lte
-rfTN(d2,t)      (2A) 
   σE,t= (
VA,t
VE,t
) N(d1,t)σA,t      (3A) 
Equation (2.A) defines VE,t as a call option on the market value of the bank’s total assets, with  
d1,t=
ln(VA,t/Lt)+(rft
+0.5σA,t)T
σA,t
 and d2,t=d1,t-σA,tT . Equation (3 A) is the optimal hedge equation that relates the 
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volatility of bank equity returns to the volatility of total asset returns (both expressed on an annualized 
basis). To solve this system of equations and to extract σA,t for each bank at yearly intervals, we employ as 
starting values for σA,t the historical annualized yearly volatility of equity returns multiplied by the ratio of 
the market value of equity to the sum of the market value of equity and the book value of total liabilities, 
i.e. σA,t=σE,tVE,t/(VE,t+Lt) . Finally, a Newton search algorithm identifies the yearly values for VA,t and 
σA,t in an iterative process. 
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Table 1: Sample Distribution by Country 
 Banks Observations 
 Number Percentage Number Percentage 
Australia 5 1.91 44 1.91 
Austria 4 1.53 33 1.43 
Belgium 3 1.15 24 1.04 
Brazil 2 0.76 20 0.87 
Canada 7 2.67 70 3.03 
Chile 2 0.76 16 0.69 
China 12 4.58 91 3.94 
Cyprus 1 0.38 7 0.3 
Czech Republic 1 0.38 10 0.43 
Denmark 3 1.15 27 1.17 
Finland 1 0.38 10 0.43 
France 4 1.53 39 1.69 
Germany 7 2.67 57 2.47 
Greece 6 2.29 53 2.3 
Hong Kong 3 1.15 30 1.3 
Hungary 1 0.38 10 0.43 
Iceland 1 0.38 3 0.13 
India 8 3.05 65 2.82 
Indonesia 2 0.76 20 0.87 
Ireland 3 1.15 24 1.04 
Israel 4 1.53 35 1.52 
Italy 6 2.29 60 2.6 
Japan 49 18.70 437 18.93 
Jordan 1 0.38 8 0.35 
Korea 6 2.29 46 1.99 
Luxembourg 1 0.38 7 0.3 
Malaysia 6 2.29 60 2.6 
Mexico 2 0.76 20 0.87 
Netherlands 3 1.15 20 0.87 
Norway 1 0.38 10 0.43 
Poland 2 0.76 19 0.82 
Portugal 3 1.15 30 1.3 
Russia 1 0.38 7 0.3 
Saudi Arabia 5 1.91 48 2.08 
Singapore 3 1.15 30 1.3 
South Africa 5 1.91 49 2.12 
Spain 6 2.29 52 2.25 
Sweden 3 1.15 30 1.3 
Switzerland 4 1.53 32 1.39 
Taiwan 12 4.58 118 5.11 
Thailand 6 2.29 57 2.47 
Turkey 5 1.91 39 1.69 
United Arab Emirates 1 0.38 10 0.43 
United Kingdom  8 3.05 62 2.69 
USA 43 16.41 370 16.02 
Total  262 100.00 2,309 100.00 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
  N Mean Median St.Dev. 1 Pctile 99 Pctile 
Panel A: Dependent Variables (2005-2014)      
Ln (Z-Score) Minus the ln transformation of a bank’s Z-Score 2305 -5.121 -4.917 0.749 -7.829 -4.568 
Equity Ratio  Book value of bank’s equity divided by its assets (%) 2305 7.207 6.568 2.920 1.915 15.736 
ROA Volatility 
Absolute yearly deviation from the average ROA over 
the sample period (%) 2305 0.627 0.627 1.239 -2.915 2.833 
ROA Net income divided by total assets (%) 2305 0.400 0.187 0.918 0.003 3.211 
Equity Volatility Volatility of daily stock returns (%) 2309 2.315 1.940 1.417 0.727 7.798 
VaR 
Bank daily return equal to the 5th percentile of the 
yearly distribution (%) 
2309 3.518 2.942 2.120 0.988 11.196 
ES 
Average bank daily returns below the 5th percentile of 
the yearly distribution (%)  
2309 5.000 4.169 3.146 1.541 17.252 
Panel B: Bank Characteristics (2004-2013)        
Board 
Independence 
Independent directors divided by total directors (%) 2309 47.015 50.000 30.070 0.000 100.000 
Size Log transformation of bank total assets (in thousands of US$) 2309 18.381 18.082 1.335 16.426 21.633 
Book-to-Market  Book value of equity divided by the market value of equity 2309 1.189 0.857 1.599 0.175 5.832 
Deposits Customer deposits divided by total debts (%) 2309 73.487 0.787 0.160 0.989 0.197 
Loans Total loans divided by total assets (%) 2309 57.839 0.604 0.141 0.826 0.137 
Lending Risk Loan loss reserves divided by total loans (%) 2309 2.669 1.681 9.344 0.000 11.414 
Board Size  Log transformation of the number of board members 2309 2.531 2.565 0.326 1.792 3.332 
CEO Power The sum of three dummy variables: a dummy equal to 1 if the 
CEO is also Chairman of the Board; a dummy equal to one if 
the CEO has been internally appointed; a dummy equal to one 
if the CEO is the only non-independent director in the board.  
2278 1.199 1.000 0.692 0.000 3.000 
Institutional 
Shareholders  
Shares owned by institutional shareholders divided by total 
shares (%) 
2233 31.016 24.260 24.244 0.082 94.410 
Panel C: Country Controls (2005-2014)       
Corruption Score defined as minus the Heritage Foundation Freedom 
from Corruption Index, with larger values denoting more 
corrupted countries 
2309 -65.071 -71.000 18.324 -94.000 -28.000 
Supervisory 
Strength 
From Barth et al. (2001) and following surveys. It assesses the 
general strength of the supervisory agency at the country level. 
The index ranges from zero to 14 and is based on the 
following questions: (1) Does the supervisory agency have the 
right to meet with external auditors to discuss reports without 
the approval of the bank? (2) Are the auditors required to 
communicate misconduct by managers/directors to the 
supervisory agency? (3) Can legal action against external 
auditors be taken by supervisors for negligence? (4) Can 
supervisors force banks to change the internal organizational 
structure? (5) Are off-balance sheet items disclosed to 
supervisors? (6) Can the supervisory agency order 
directors/management to constitute provisions to cover 
actual/potential losses? (7) Can the supervisory agency 
suspend director’s decisions to distribute: (a) Dividends? (b) 
Bonuses? (c) Management fees? (8) Can the supervisory 
agency supersede bank shareholder rights and declare a bank 
insolvent? (9) Does banking law allow the supervisory agency 
to suspend some or all ownership rights of a problem bank? 
(10) Regarding bank restructuring and reorganization, can the 
supervisory agency or any other government agency do the 
following: (a) Suspend shareholder rights? (b) Remove and 
replace management? (c) Remove and replace directors? 
2309 11.248 12.000 1.974 5.000 14.000 
No Basel I A dummy equal to one if a country has abandoned Basel I 2309 0.617 1.000 0.486 0.000 1.000 
Concentration 
Log transformation of the Herfindhal index of asset 
concentration in the domestic banking market 
2309 -2.679 -2.700 0.712 -4.038 -1.169 
GDP Growth Annual real growth rate of the domestic GDP (%) 2309 2.348 2.200 3.369 -5.500 10.600 
Public Debt 
Ratio between the volume of debt from the public sector and 
country GDP (%) 
2309 89.462 66.800 65.756 4.600 242.200 
Econ_Dev Log transformation of the GDP per capita in US dollars 2309 10.189 10.476 0.896 7.155 11.368 
Shareholder 
Protection 
Country index measuring the strength of minority shareholder 
protection from Doing Business by the WorldBank 
2309 6.665 7.000 1.472 3.000 9.300 
Market Volatility  Volatility of the domestic stock market based on Datastream 
Stock Market Indexes (%) 
2309 1.418 1.275 0.623 0.629 3.564 
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Table 3: Does the Impact of Board Independence on Bank Risk Change Post-2009? 
This Table shows the results of the impact of board independence on bank Z-Score and market measures of bank risk. The models are estimated with 
firm fixed effects. Board Independence is the ratio between the number of independent directors and the total number of directors, Post2009 is a dummy 
equal to one for the years following 2009, Size is the log transformation of a bank’s total assets ((measured in thousands of US dollars), Book-to-Market 
is the ratio between the book value of equity and the market value of equity, Deposits is equal to customer deposits over total debts, Loans is the ratio 
between total loans and total assets, Lending Risk is equal to loan loss reserves divided by total loans, Board Size is the log transformation of the 
number of board members, Equity Ratio is the ratio between the book value of equity and the book value of bank assets. Corruption is the degree of 
corruption at the country level measured by minus the Freedom from Corruption Index by the Heritage Foundation with higher values denoting higher 
corruption, Supervisory Strength is an index that captures the strength of the supervisory agency, No Basel I is a dummy equal to one if a country has 
abandoned Basel I, , Concentration is the log transformation of the Herfindahl index of banking market concentration based on total assets,  GDP 
Growth is the annual real growth rate of domestic GDP, Econ_Dev  is the log transformation of the GDP per capita in US dollars, Public Debt is the 
ratio between public sector debt and country GDP, Shareholder Protection is an index capturing the degree of protection of minority shareholders as 
provided by World Bank Doing Business,  Market Volatility is the yearly volatility of domestic stock market, CEO Power is an index measuring the 
degree of power of the Chief Executive Officer based on i) CEO duality, ii) on whether the CEO has been internally appointed, iii) on whether there are 
only non-independent directors in the board, Institutional Shareholders is the percentage of shares owned by institutional shareholders. Robust 
standard errors clustered at the bank level are reported in round brackets for the fixed effect models. All specifications control for time dummies. *** 
(**,*) indicates significance at the 1(5, 10) percent level. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Ln (Z_Score) Equity Volatility VaR ES 
          
Board Independence  -0.017 -0.001 0.023 -0.003 -0.001 -0.004 -0.002 -0.007 -0.004 
 (0.155) (0.157) (0.167) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006) 
Board 
Independence*Post2009 
-0.212** -0.186** -0.192** -0.004** -0.004*** -0.005** -0.006*** -0.010*** -0.011*** 
 (0.090) (0.092) (0.095) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) 
Post2009 -0.365*** -0.326*** -0.317*** 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 
 (0.100) (0.099) (0.106) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) 
Size  -0.018 -0.041 -0.085 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.005 0.005 
 (0.073) (0.081) (0.080) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Book-to-Market  0.007 0.008 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 
  (0.016) (0.016) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Deposits  -0.424** -0.423* -0.012** -0.011** -0.014** -0.014** -0.021** -0.020** 
  (0.213) (0.223) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.011) (0.010) 
Loans  0.186 0.148 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.006 0.004 0.007 
  (0.263) (0.269) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.010) 
Lending Risk  2.912*** 2.762*** 0.096*** 0.106*** 0.137*** 0.152*** 0.196*** 0.224*** 
  (0.923) (0.969) (0.022) (0.024) (0.028) (0.030) (0.047) (0.051) 
Board Size   0.155 0.183* -0.002 -0.003** -0.002 -0.003 -0.005 -0.006** 
  (0.099) (0.101) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Equity Ratio    -0.073*** -0.074*** -0.069** -0.073** -0.136** -0.145*** 
    (0.024) (0.024) (0.032) (0.032) (0.053) (0.054) 
Corruption -0.004 -0.005 -0.003 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Supervisory Strength -0.024* -0.027** -0.026** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
No Basel I 0.011 -0.004 -0.004 -0.002** -0.002** -0.002* -0.002* -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.048) (0.048) (0.049) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Concentration 0.399*** 0.388*** 0.413*** 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.003 
 (0.095) (0.098) (0.103) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) 
GDP Growth  -2.433*** -2.041*** -2.201*** -0.042*** -0.042*** -0.059*** -0.062*** -0.076*** -0.080*** 
 (0.762) (0.764) (0.777) (0.010) (0.011) (0.015) (0.016) (0.023) (0.024) 
Econ_Dev 0.583 0.740** 0.944*** -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.007 -0.009 -0.012 
 (0.361) (0.373) (0.359) (0.004) (0.005) (0.008) (0.007) (0.010) (0.011) 
Public Debt  -0.325* -0.347* -0.329* -0.007** -0.008** -0.009** -0.011** -0.014** -0.016** 
 (0.190) (0.191) (0.189) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) 
Shareholder Protection 0.035 0.018 0.028 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 
 (0.046) (0.045) (0.046) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Market Volatility 10.976*** 9.595** 8.946* 1.381*** 1.446*** 2.094*** 2.159*** 3.073*** 3.187*** 
 (4.046) (4.065) (4.793) (0.082) (0.083) (0.120) (0.121) (0.181) (0.186) 
CEO Power   -0.006  -0.000  -0.000  -0.001 
   (0.037)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Institutional Shareholders    -0.013  0.006**  0.011***  0.017*** 
   (0.112)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.005) 
Constant -9.394*** -10.784*** -12.001*** 0.053 0.061 0.050 0.082 0.104 0.124 
 (3.230) (3.406) (3.395) (0.050) (0.053) (0.081) (0.076) (0.114) (0.117) 
Observations 2,305 2,305 2,204 2,309 2,207 2,309 2,207 2,309 2,207 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.064 0.069 0.070 0.698 0.709 0.724 0.729 0.691 0.699 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 4: Does the Impact of Board Independence on Z-Score Components Change Post-2009? 
This Table shows the results of the impact of board independence on bank Z-Score components. The models are estimated with firm fixed effects. 
Board Independence is the ratio between the number of independent directors and the total number of directors, Post2009 is a dummy equal to one for 
the years following 2009, Size is the log transformation of a bank’s total assets ((measured in thousands of US dollars), Book-to-Market is the ratio 
between the book value of equity and the market value of equity, Deposits is equal to customer deposits over total debts, Loans is the ratio between 
total loans and total assets, Lending Risk is equal to loan loss reserves divided by total loans, Board Size is the log transformation of the number of 
board members, Corruption is the degree of corruption at the country level measured by minus the Freedom from Corruption Index by the Heritage 
Foundation with higher values denoting higher corruption, Supervisory Strength is an index that captures the strength of the supervisory agency, No 
Basel I is a dummy equal to one if a country has abandoned Basel I, , Concentration is the log transformation of the Herfindahl index of banking 
market concentration based on total assets,  GDP Growth is the annual real growth rate of domestic GDP, Econ_Dev  is the log transformation of the 
GDP per capita in US dollars, Public Debt is the ratio between public sector debt and country GDP, Shareholder Protection is an index capturing the 
degree of protection of minority shareholders as provided by World Bank Doing Business,  Market Volatility is the yearly volatility of domestic stock 
market, CEO Power is an index measuring the degree of power of the Chief Executive Officer based on i) CEO duality, ii) on whether the CEO has 
been internally appointed, iii) on whether there are only non-independent directors in the board, Institutional Shareholders is the percentage of shares 
owned by institutional shareholders. Robust standard errors clustered at the bank level are reported in round brackets for the fixed effect models. All 
specifications control for time dummies. *** (**,*) indicates significance at the 1(5, 10) percent level. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 ROA Equity Ratio ROA Volatility 
Board Independence  0.000 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) 
Board Independence*Post2009 0.001 0.001 0.008*** 0.009*** -0.002** -0.002*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) 
Post2009 -0.003*** -0.004*** 0.010*** 0.009*** -0.001* -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) 
Size  -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.007*** -0.009*** 0.000 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Book-to-Market -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001* -0.001** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Deposits 0.008*** 0.008** 0.019** 0.018** -0.003 -0.002 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.008) (0.002) (0.002) 
Loans -0.005* -0.005 0.003 0.001 0.004** 0.004* 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.009) (0.009) (0.002) (0.002) 
Lending Risk -0.060*** -0.064*** 0.115*** 0.095*** 0.005 0.007 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.031) (0.033) (0.009) (0.009) 
Board Size  -0.003** -0.002** -0.006 -0.006 0.002** 0.002** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) 
Corruption -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000** 0.000** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Supervisory Strength 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
No Basel I 0.001 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Concentration -0.004*** -0.003** -0.000 0.002 0.002*** 0.002** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) 
GDP Growth  0.047*** 0.046*** 0.020 0.016 -0.017*** -0.017*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.022) (0.023) (0.005) (0.005) 
Econ_Dev 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.030** 0.047*** 0.002 0.002 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.015) (0.010) (0.002) (0.002) 
Public Debt  0.007*** 0.007*** -0.000 0.006 -0.001 -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) 
Shareholder Protection 0.001 0.002* 0.004*** 0.004** -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Market Volatility -0.154*** -0.204*** -0.070 0.062 0.039 -0.025 
 (0.055) (0.056) (0.122) (0.117) (0.042) (0.039) 
CEO Power  0.000  -0.001  0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000) 
Institutional Shareholders   0.002  -0.007  -0.000 
  (0.002)  (0.005)  (0.001) 
Constant -0.123*** -0.132*** -0.143 -0.268*** -0.016 -0.004 
 (0.030) (0.028) (0.133) (0.092) (0.014) (0.017) 
Observations 2,305 2,204 2,305 2,204 2,305 2,305 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.297 0.306 0.190 0.198 0.066 0.297 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 5: Impact of Independent Directors on Taxpayers: Bank Public Recapitalizations 
This Table shows the impact of board independence on bank public recapitalizations required by the global financial crisis. In columns (1) and 
(2) we estimate a logit model where the dependent variable is a dummy equal one if a bank has received public funds during the global crisis. In 
remaining columns we estimate Tobit models where the dependent variable is the ratio between the amount of public funds received after 2006 
and bank total assets at the end of 2006. Board Independence is the ratio between the number of independent directors and the total number 
of directors, Size is the log transformation of the bank total assets (measured in thousands of US dollars), ROA is the ratio between net income 
and total assets, Book-to-Market is the ratio between book value of equity and market value of equity, Customer Deposits is the ratio between 
customer deposits and bank total funding,, Loans is the ratio between total loans and total assets, Lending Risk is equal to loan loss reserves 
divided by total loans,  Equity is the ratio between bank book equity and total assets, MES is the average bank daily stock return when the market 
is the lowest 5 percent of the yearly distribution, IPP is the fair insurance premium described in section 2.1, Board Size is the log transformation 
of the number of board members, CEO Power is an index measuring the degree of power of the Chief Executive Officer based on i) CEO 
duality, ii) on whether the CEO has been internally appointed, iii) on whether is the only non-independent director in the board, Institutional 
Shareholders is the percentage of shares owned by institutional shareholders. Robust t statistics are reported in round brackets for the fixed 
effect models. All specifications control for time dummies. *** (**,*) indicates significance at the 1(5,10) percent level. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
   
Board Independence 2.136 3.919*** 0.036** 0.047** 0.053** 
 (1.306) (1.423) (0.018) (0.021) (0.025) 
Size 0.556** 0.707** 0.007** 0.007* 0.001 
 (0.247) (0.300) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
ROA -1.106 -22.656 0.076 -0.087 2.040 
 (55.571) (62.035) (0.958) (0.964) (1.469) 
Book-to-Market -3.390*** -3.875*** -0.054*** -0.061*** -0.005 
 (1.084) (1.337) (0.017) (0.020) (0.037) 
Customer Deposits -1.153 -0.441 -0.010 -0.002 0.015 
 (1.444) (2.213) (0.020) (0.024) (0.028) 
Loans  5.406*** 8.179*** 0.125*** 0.146*** 0.043 
 (1.842) (2.226) (0.045) (0.051) (0.026) 
Lending Risk -4.730 -28.109 -0.107 -0.631 0.308 
 (15.299) (35.997) (0.315) (0.505) (0.903) 
Equity  -3.700 -5.964 -0.174 -0.106 -0.025 
 (12.024) (15.160) (0.181) (0.186) (0.206) 
MES 37.004* 38.606* 0.770 0.543 1.944 
 (19.680) (23.219) (0.518) (0.450) (1.663) 
IPP 4.198*** 5.076*** 0.052*** 0.071*** -0.022 
 (1.454) (1.897) (0.018) (0.023) (0.055) 
Board Size  0.291 0.613 -0.006 -0.002 0.022 
 (0.724) (0.821) (0.010) (0.010) (0.017) 
CEO Power  -0.098  -0.004 0.005 
  (0.571)  (0.006) (0.008) 
Institutional Shareholders   1.408  0.059* -0.006 
  (1.535)  (0.034) (0.025) 
Constant -17.090*** -24.058*** -0.255*** -0.288*** -0.194** 
 (5.575) (6.638) (0.076) (0.084) (0.071) 
      
Observations 240 222 240 222 40 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.440 0.516    
Country Full Sample Full Sample Full Sample Full Sample Only US 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 6: Does the Impact of Board Independence on Bank Risk Change Post-2009?  
Controlling for the Bailout Effect 
This Table shows the results of the impact of board independence on bank Z-Score and market measures of bank risk. The models are estimated with 
firm fixed effects. Board Independence is the ratio between the number of independent directors and the total number of directors, Post2009_Bailout  is 
a dummy equal to one for the years following 2009 for banks that received a government bailout, Post2009_No_Bailout  is a dummy equal to one for the 
years following 2009 for the remaining banks in the sample, Size  is log transformation of the bank total assets (measured in thousands of US dollars), 
Book-to-Market is the ratio between book value of equity and market value of equity, Deposits is equal to customer deposits over total debts, Loans 
is the ratio between total loans and total assets, Lending Risk is equal to loan loss reserves divided by total loans, Equity Ratio is the ratio between the 
book value of equity and the book value of bank assets, Board Size is the log transformation of the number of board members, Corruption is the degree 
of corruption at the country level measured by minus the Freedom from Corruption Index by Heritage Foundation - with higher values denoting higher 
corruption, Supervisory Strength is an index that captures the strength of the supervisory agency, No Basel I is a dummy equal to one if a country has 
abandoned Basel I, Concentration is the log transformation of the Herfindahl index of banking market concentration based on total assets,  GDP 
Growth is the annual real growth rate of domestic GDP, Econ_Dev  is the log transformation of the GDP per capita in US dollars, Public Debt is the 
ratio between public sector debt and country GDP, Shareholder Protection is an index capturing the degree of protection of minority shareholders as 
provided by World Bank Doing Business,  Market Volatility is the yearly volatility of the domestic stock market, CEO Power is an index measuring 
the degree of power of the Chief Executive Officer based on i) CEO duality, ii) on whether the CEO has been internally appointed, iii) on whether there 
are only non-independent directors in the board, Institutional Shareholders is the percentage of shares owned by institutional shareholders. Robust 
standard errors clustered at the bank level are reported in round brackets for the fixed effect models. All specifications control for time dummies. *** 
(**,*) indicates significance at the 1(5, 10) percent level. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Ln (Z_Score) Equity Volatility VaR ES 
Board Independence  0.033 0.061 -0.001 -0.000 -0.002 -0.000 -0.004 -0.001 
 (0.158) (0.169) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) 
Board Independence*Post2009_Bailout -0.427*** -0.448*** -0.014*** -0.016*** -0.021*** -0.023*** -0.032*** -0.036*** 
 (0.153) (0.164) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.009) 
Board 
Independence*Post2009_No_Bailout 
-0.148 -0.149 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.118) (0.121) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Post2009_Bailout -0.245** -0.235* -0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 
 (0.113) (0.120) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) 
Post2009_No_Bailout -0.335*** -0.318*** 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.004 0.004 
 (0.102) (0.109) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) 
Size  -0.043 -0.089 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.004 
 (0.081) (0.081) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Book-to-Market 0.004 0.005 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Deposits -0.426** -0.423* -0.012** -0.011** -0.014** -0.014** -0.021* -0.020** 
 (0.213) (0.223) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.011) (0.010) 
Loans 0.179 0.136 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003 -0.002 0.001 
 (0.267) (0.273) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.011) (0.011) 
Lending Risk 2.827*** 2.718*** 0.104*** 0.116*** 0.145*** 0.161*** 0.214*** 0.244*** 
 (0.900) (0.945) (0.024) (0.025) (0.029) (0.032) (0.050) (0.054) 
Board Size  0.167* 0.194* -0.002 -0.002* -0.001 -0.002 -0.004 -0.005* 
 (0.099) (0.101) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Equity Ratio   -0.062** -0.063** -0.057* -0.061* -0.111** -0.121** 
   (0.025) (0.025) (0.034) (0.034) (0.055) (0.056) 
Corruption -0.005 -0.003 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Supervisory Strength -0.026** -0.025* -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
No Basel I -0.011 -0.012 -0.002** -0.003*** -0.003** -0.003** -0.004* -0.004** 
 (0.048) (0.049) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Concentration 0.400*** 0.418*** 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.005 0.004 
 (0.099) (0.103) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) 
GDP Growth  -1.894** -2.062*** -0.037*** -0.037*** -0.052*** -0.055*** -0.066*** -0.070*** 
 (0.767) (0.778) (0.010) (0.010) (0.015) (0.015) (0.023) (0.024) 
Econ_Dev 0.831** 1.020*** -0.000 0.000 0.002 -0.001 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.356) (0.354) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.011) 
Public Debt  -0.351* -0.335* -0.005* -0.006* -0.007 -0.009* -0.009 -0.011 
 (0.191) (0.191) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) 
Shareholder Protection 0.013 0.022 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001* -0.002 -0.003 
 (0.046) (0.047) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Market Volatility 8.822** 8.070* 1.365*** 1.428*** 2.064*** 2.122*** 3.040*** 3.144*** 
 (4.102) (4.851) (0.080) (0.081) (0.118) (0.121) (0.179) (0.185) 
CEO Power  -0.003  -0.000  -0.000  -0.001 
  (0.037)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Institutional Shareholders   -0.012  0.007***  0.011***  0.018*** 
  (0.112)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.005) 
Constant -11.630*** -12.677*** 0.038 0.034 0.019 0.041 0.071 0.064 
 (3.284) (3.357) (0.048) (0.055) (0.078) (0.077) (0.108) (0.120) 
Observations 2,305 2,204 2,309 2,207 2,309 2,207 2,309 2,207 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.070 0.070 0.706 0.718 0.729 0.735 0.699 0.707 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 7: Does the Impact of Board Independence on Z-Score Components Change Post-2009?  
Controlling for the Bailout Effect  
This Table shows the results of the impact of board independence on the components of a bank Z-Score. The models are estimated with firm fixed effects. 
Board Independence is the ratio between the number of independent directors and the total number of directors, Post2009_Bailout  is a dummy equal to one 
for the years following 2009 for banks that received a government bailout, Post2009_No_Bailout  is a dummy equal to one for the years following 2009 for the 
remaining banks in the sample, Size is the log transformation of the bank total assets (measured in thousands of US dollars), Size is the log transformation 
of a bank’s total assets (measured in thousands of US dollars), Book-to-Market is the ratio between the book value of equity and the market value of equity, 
Deposits is equal to customer deposits over total debts, Loans is the ratio between total loans and total assets, Lending Risk is equal to loan loss reserves 
divided by total loans, Board Size is the log transformation of the number of board members, Corruption is the degree of corruption at the country level 
measured by minus the Freedom from Corruption Index by Heritage Foundation with higher values denoting higher corruption, Supervisory Strength is 
an index that captures the strength of the supervisory agency, No Basel I is a dummy equal to one if a country has abandoned Basel I, , Concentration is 
log transformation of the Herfindahl index of banking market concentration based on total assets, GDP Growth is the annual real growth rate of domestic 
GDP, Econ_Dev  is the log transformation of the GDP per capita in US dollars, Public Debt is the ratio between public sector debt and country GDP, 
Shareholder Protection is an index capturing the degree of protection of minority shareholders as provided by World Bank Doing Business,  Market 
Volatility is the yearly volatility of domestic stock market, CEO Power is an index measuring the degree of power of the Chief Executive Officer based on 
i) CEO duality, ii) on whether the CEO has been internally appointed, iii) on whether there are only non-independent directors in the board, Institutional 
Shareholders is the percentage of shares owned by institutional shareholders. Robust standard errors clustered at the bank level are reported in round 
brackets for the fixed effect models. All specifications control for time dummies. *** (**,*) indicates significance at the 1(5, 10) percent level. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 ROA Equity Ratio ROA Volatility 
Board Independence  -0.000 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) 
Board Independence*Post2009_Bailout 0.003 0.004 0.012 0.013 -0.004** -0.005*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.008) (0.002) (0.002) 
Board Independence*Post2009_No_Bailout -0.001 -0.000 0.006** 0.007** 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) 
Post2009_Bailouts -0.003** -0.004** 0.011** 0.009** -0.002*** -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) 
Post2009_No_Bailout -0.004*** -0.004*** 0.010*** 0.008*** -0.001 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) 
Size  -0.002** -0.002*** -0.007** -0.009*** -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Book-to-Market -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001* -0.002** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Deposits 0.008*** 0.007** 0.018** 0.018** -0.003 -0.002 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.008) (0.002) (0.002) 
Loans -0.063*** -0.067*** 0.110*** 0.091*** 0.010 0.012 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.032) (0.034) (0.009) (0.009) 
Lending Risk -0.005 -0.004 0.005 0.002 0.003 0.002 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.009) (0.009) (0.002) (0.002) 
Board Size  -0.003** -0.003** -0.006* -0.006 0.002** 0.002** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) 
Corruption -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Supervisory Strength 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
No Basel I 0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Concentration -0.004*** -0.004** -0.000 0.002 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) 
GDP Growth  0.045*** 0.045*** 0.018 0.014 -0.016*** -0.015*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.022) (0.023) (0.005) (0.005) 
Econ_Dev 0.014*** 0.015*** 0.029* 0.046*** 0.003** 0.003 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.015) (0.010) (0.002) (0.002) 
Public Debt  0.006*** 0.006** -0.001 0.005 0.000 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) 
Shareholder Protection 0.001 0.002** 0.004*** 0.004** -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Market Volatility -0.149*** -0.200*** -0.065 0.068 0.037 -0.027 
 (0.055) (0.056) (0.124) (0.119) (0.041) (0.039) 
CEO Power  0.000  -0.001  0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000) 
Institutional Shareholders   0.002  -0.008  -0.000 
  (0.002)  (0.005)  (0.001) 
Constant -0.118*** -0.124*** -0.139 -0.256*** -0.017 -0.012 
 (0.028) (0.029) (0.129) (0.092) (0.013) (0.017) 
Observations 2,305 2,204 2,305 2,204 2,305 2,204 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.299 0.309 0.192 0.199 0.079 0.077 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table A1: Alternative Specifications 
 
This Table shows the results of additional tests on the impact of board independence on bank risk. Panel A reports the results of random effect models 
while Panel B employs two lags of the bank-level explanatory variables in the fixed effect regressions. Panel C shows the results of dynamic panel data 
models estimated via the two-step GMM estimator proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998) with standard errors adjusted via the finite sample 
correction derived by Windmeijer (2005). Panel D refers to a 2SLS analysis based on a panel data setting and with contemporaneous explanatory 
variables. The degree of board independence is instrumented using the log transformation of the ratio between newspapers in circulation and population 
in a country and the median value of the degree of board independence in country with the same legal origin and banking system size.  Board 
Independence is the ratio between the number of independent directors and the total number of directors, Post2009 is a dummy equal to one for the 
years following 2009. All specifications control for the explanatory variables employed in the main tests including time dummies. *** (**,*) indicates 
significance at the 1(5, 10) percent level. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A: Random Effect Model      
 Ln (Z_Score) Equity Volatility VaR  ES 
Board Independence  0.202* 0.001 0.001 0.002 
 (0.106) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) 
Board Independence* Post2009 -0.220** -0.004*** -0.006*** -0.011*** 
 (0.093) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) 
Post2009 0.019 0.001 0.002 0.004 
 (0.093) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) 
Observations 2,204 2,207 2,207 2,207 
Adjusted R-Squared     
Bank Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank Fixed Effects No No No No 
Country Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes No 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
 
Panel B: Fixed Effect Models - Two Lags      
 Ln (Z_Score) Equity Volatility VaR  ES 
Board Independence  0.118 0.003 0.003 0.005 
 (0.177) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) 
Board Independence* Post2009 -0.221** -0.008*** -0.010*** -0.018*** 
 (0.102) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) 
Post2009 -0.199* -0.001 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.109) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) 
Observations 1,953 1,956 1,956 1,956 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.061 0.662 0.696 0.669 
Bank Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Fixed Effects  No No No No 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table A1 (continued) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel C: GMM Model     
 Ln (Z_Score) Equity Volatility VaR  ES 
Riskt-1 0.167*** 0.348*** 0.308*** 0.264*** 
 (0.041) (0.039) (0.036) (0.034) 
Risk t-2  -0.127*** -0.060*  
  (0.037) (0.036)  
Board Independence  0.457*** 0.005* 0.001 0.010 
 (0.164) (0.003) (0.004) (0.007) 
Board Independence* Post2009 -0.198* -0.007*** -0.008*** -0.015*** 
 (0.113) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) 
Post2009 0.034 0.002 0.002 0.001 
 (0.092) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) 
Observations 2,204 1,970 1,970 2,207 
M2-test (p-value) 0.216 0.555 0.106 0.141 
Hansen J test (p-value) 0.825 0.773 0.709 0.661 
Bank Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
 
 
Panel D: Instrumental Variable Analysis   
 Ln (Z_Score) Equity Volatility VaR  ES 
Board Independence  -0.565 0.032 0.059 0.090 
 (0.943) (0.027) (0.037) (0.060) 
Board Independence* Post2009 -0.205 -0.011*** -0.013*** -0.024*** 
 (0.140) (0.004) (0.005) (0.008) 
Post2009 -0.332** 0.006** 0.006 0.010 
 (0.133) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) 
Observations 2,215 2,215 2,215 2,215 
Adjusted R-Squared -0.057 0.653 0.669 0.632 
Kleibergen_Paap Underidentification test 
(p=value) 
0.026 0.026 0.026 0.026 
Hansen J test (p-value 0.207 0.550 0.339 0.599 
Bank Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Fixed Effects  No No No No 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table A2: Sub-Sample Analysis for Bailout and Non-Bailout Banks 
 
This Table shows the results of additional tests on the impact of board independence on bank risk. Panel A reports the results of fixed effect model that 
have received a government bailout while Panel B focuses on the other banks included in our sample  Board Independence is the ratio between the 
number of independent directors and the total number of directors, Post2009 is a dummy equal to one for the years following 2009. All specifications 
control for the explanatory variables employed in the main tests including time dummies. *** (**,*) indicates significance at the 1(5, 10) percent level. 
Panel A: Bailout Banks      
 Ln (Z_Score) Equity Volatility VaR  ES 
Board Independence  0.058 -0.001 -0.002 -0.006 
 (0.160) (0.006) (0.007) (0.013) 
Board Independence* Post2009 -0.530*** -0.013*** -0.019*** -0.029*** 
 (0.161) (0.004) (0.005) (0.008) 
Post2009 -0.209 -0.009** -0.012** -0.019** 
 (0.145) (0.004) (0.005) (0.008) 
Observations 520 520 520 520 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.156 0.845 0.857 0.836 
Bank Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
 
     
Panel B: Non-Bailout Banks      
 Ln (Z_Score) Equity Volatility VaR  ES 
Board Independence  0.009 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.239) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) 
Board Independence* Post2009 -0.152 -0.001 -0.002 -0.004 
 (0.120) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Post2009 -0.362*** -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.134) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Observations 1,684 1,687 1,687 1,687 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.067 0.719 0.725 0.712 
Bank Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table A3: US Sample- Risk Analysis 
This Table shows the results of the tests on the impact of board independence on bank risk for the sub-sample of US banks. Panel A reports the results 
of the fixed effect model for the sub-sample of US banks while Panel B focuses on US banks that have received a government support and Panel C on 
the other banks included in our sample.  Board Independence is the ratio between the number of independent directors and the total number of 
directors, Post2009_Bailout  is a dummy equal to one for the years following 2009 for banks that received a government bailout, Post2009_No_Bailout  is a 
dummy equal to one for the years following 2009 for the remaining banks in the sample, Post2009 is a dummy equal to one for the years following 2009. 
All specifications control for the explanatory variables employed in the main tests including time dummies. *** (**,*) indicates significance at the 1(5, 10) 
percent level. 
Panel A: All US Banks     
 Ln (Z_Score) Equity Volatility VaR  ES 
Board Independence  -0.175 0.003 0.003 0.002 
 (0.392) (0.005) (0.007) (0.012) 
Board Independence*Post2009_Bailout -0.582 -0.018*** -0.019*** -0.038*** 
 (0.510) (0.005) (0.007) (0.011) 
Board Independence*Post2009_No_Bailout -0.360 -0.009 -0.013 -0.024 
 (0.399) (0.008) (0.013) (0.018) 
Post2009_Bailouts -0.193 -0.047*** -0.068*** -0.100*** 
 (0.236) (0.003) (0.004) (0.007) 
Post2009_No_Bailout -0.362* -0.045*** -0.064*** -0.093*** 
 (0.199) (0.004) (0.005) (0.008) 
Observations 359 359 359 359 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.174 0.886 0.881 0.862 
Bank Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
 
Panel B: Bailout US Banks      
 Ln (Z_Score) Equity Volatility VaR  ES 
Board Independence  -0.569 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.395) (0.006) (0.007) (0.012) 
Board Independence* Post2009 -0.433 -0.019*** -0.021*** -0.044*** 
 (0.496) (0.005) (0.007) (0.011) 
Post2009 -0.283 -0.049*** -0.069*** -0.100*** 
 (0.251) (0.004) (0.005) (0.009) 
Observations 253 253 253 253 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.220 0.918 0.915 0.903 
Bank Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
 
 
Panel C: Non-Bailout US Banks      
 Ln (Z_Score) Equity Volatility VaR  ES 
Board Independence  1.115 -0.006 -0.005 -0.042 
 (1.162) (0.009) (0.018) (0.034) 
Board Independence* Post2009 -0.460 -0.006 -0.009 -0.013 
 (0.344) (0.007) (0.014) (0.017) 
Post2009 0.174 0.003 0.010 0.008 
 (0.389) (0.007) (0.012) (0.020) 
Observations 106 106 106 106 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.101 0.813 0.778 0.744 
Bank Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table A4: US Sample- Z-Score Components 
This Table shows the results of the impact of board independence on Z-Score components for the sub-sample of US banks. Board Independence is 
the ratio between the number of independent directors and the total number of directors, Post2009_Bailout is a dummy equal to one for the years following 
2009 for banks that received a government bailout, Post2009_No_Bailout is a dummy equal to one for the years following 2009 for the remaining banks in 
the sample. All specifications control for the explanatory variables employed in the main tests including time dummies. *** (**,*) indicates significance 
at the 1(5, 10) percent level. 
 ROA Equity Ratio ROA Volatility   
Board Independence  -0.010** 0.005 -0.003 
 (0.004) (0.015) (0.004) 
Board Independence*Post2009_Bailout 0.006 -0.044 -0.008* 
 (0.009) (0.029) (0.004) 
Board Independence*Post2009_No_Bailout -0.003 -0.005 -0.003 
 (0.005) (0.017) (0.003) 
Post2009_Bailouts 0.010** 0.024* -0.005** 
 (0.004) (0.012) (0.002) 
Post2009_No_Bailout 0.008*** 0.006 -0.005** 
 (0.003) (0.007) (0.002) 
Observations 359 359 359 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.409 0.321 0.192 
Bank Controls  Yes Yes Yes 
Country Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
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Research Highlights 
 
1. We analyze the relationship between risks of large banks and board independence 
2. Post-2009 increasing board independence reduces bank risk compared to 2004-2009  
3. This result holds for accounting and market measures of risk 
4. Additional tests show, however, that our finding is driven by bailout banks 
5. In most large international banks board independence does not influence risk 
 
 
 
